Poles Apart: Global Environmental Negotiations

THE SOUTH IS becoming increasingly powerless to negotiate conditions for climate change, given the strength of protection for the economic interests of the North. Indeed, global environmental negotiations are forcing the South to take on repeated and costly technical transitions whilst the most persistent polluter, the US, has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol.

However, the countries of the South have not always been skilled negotiators and have, in many cases, failed to devolve power while preparing and implementing national action plans, as well as sidelining themselves in the global arena by not participating enough in the early stages. Today, the global institutional framework for the environment is in crisis and Northern governments have been stepping up their demands for a World Environment Organization (WEO), reassembled perhaps from a strengthened United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Despite historical evidence, the countries of the South have dared to hope that the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) will finally address their development concerns through processes such as the creation of a global fund and programme to empower the globally “marginalized” to deal with their “ecological poverty”. They also hope that local and global democracy, which is the most essential component of sustainable development, can be strengthened; that an enabling framework can be set up which would help the world leap into frontier technologies that are environmentally sound and equal; and that liability and penalty systems for toxic modes of development can be created.

The book is divided into two sections. The main part of the book, which comprises the first five chapters, covers five major conventions and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in detail; the second part is concerned with briefer updates on other existing conventions.

The first chapter, entitled “Mediocre Model”, covers the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) and the Montreal Protocol (1987). It describes how, due to pressure from manufacturers who produce CFCs, the Vienna convention in 1985 did not even mention ozone depleting substances (ODS), becoming instead an umbrella agreement on monitoring, research and data exchanges.

In 1987, the Montreal Protocol set reduction targets for eight ODS. Since then, the protocol has been amended four times to include other substances. Many countries of the South were pressurized into joining the protocol, although they had not been part of the initial negotiations and there were several discriminatory provisions. The establishment of a “multilateral fund” to help them meet their commitments, and a few amendments were all the changes that could be made. In addition, the alternatives to ODS agreed under the protocol also proved to be problematic, either being no better or causing global warming. This protocol also fails as a model for other environmental treaties since it does not assign any penalties for the overuse or abuse of the global commons.

The second chapter, “Dirty Business”, covers the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989). This arose as, in the 1980s, there were numerous cases of industrialized countries dumping hazardous wastes in the South. Increasing awareness of this led to calls for a global treaty to regulate this behaviour. However, many environmentalists and Southern countries did not find the treaty strong enough, as it still allowed restricted trade rather than an outright ban. After much pushing, in 1995 a complete ban on hazardous waste trade was implemented between OECD and non-OECD countries.

There is opposition to the ban by some, including the World Trade Organization, because it also covers wastes which are recycled and can be used for industrial purposes. The convention has adopted a landmark protocol on compensation and liability for damages incurre